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I. INTRODUCTION
Successful discovery requires a delicate balance between discovering 
the truth and protecting litigants from undue hardship.  That balance 
demands even greater attention when the litigants are from different
countries with different rules and policies regarding discovery.1  French 
laws complicate this balance by imposing criminal sanctions on anyone 
who provides information that originated in France to parties conducting 
discovery in foreign nations.2  This law is a blocking statute employed in 
many countries, in addition to France.  Because of this law, French 
litigants have had to face the problem of either being sanctioned and 
losing lawsuits in the United States or being subject to criminal sanctions
in France.3  The Hague Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad (Hague 
Convention)4 was supposed to solve the problems associated with taking
evidence abroad, but the U.S. Supreme Court has found the Hague 
Convention  optional at best and has not required trial courts to use the 
1. See Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 
522, 533 (1987) (outlining the concern of international discovery).
2. See Loi No. 80-538 du 16 juillet 1980 relative à la communication de documents
ou renseignements d’ordre économique, commercial ou technique à des personnes physiques 
ou morales étrangères, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [Official 
Gazette of France], July 16, 1980, p. 1799 [hereinafter French Blocking Statute] (imposing
a blanket prohibition of disclosure of information in France to foreign public authorities). 
3. See discussion infra Part V.C. 
4. See generally Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or 
Commercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1780) [hereinafter Convention]. 
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methods set out in the Hague Convention.5  The Hague Convention also
allowed countries the option of not participating in “pre-trial” discovery
procedures, which is an essential component of U.S. discovery.6 
French litigants in U.S. courts face another hurdle: the European 
Union privacy directives.7 These directives prevent the dissemination of 
information to countries that do not pass the approved standards for data
privacy and protection.8  The Hague Convention has not considered the
effect these recent privacy directives have on the taking of evidence
because the Hague Convention has not been modified since it was adopted
and opened for signatures in 1970.9 
Therefore, the Hague Convention must be changed in the following
ways to address the shortcomings with the treaty’s handling of data
privacy issues: (1) the Hague Convention needs to be rewritten so it is 
the first resort for taking evidence abroad; (2) treaty signatories need to 
accept the Hague Convention conditions and release litigants from 
liability if the Hague Convention is used for discovery; and (3) Article 
23 of the Hague Convention requires alteration so that pre-trial discovery
is clearly defined as discovery occurring before a suit is commenced.  If 
these alterations are not possible, Article 23 should be eliminated.
5. See Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 533–45. 
6. Convention, supra note 4, art. 23 (“A contracting state may at the time of
signature, ratification or accession, declare that it will not execute Letters of Request issued
for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents as known in Common Law 
countries.”).
7. See generally Council Directive 95/46, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 24 Oct. 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data [hereinafter Data Protection
Directive], 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/Lex 
UriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML (last visited August 16, 2010) (providing 
the procedures and policies for transferring automated data between member countries and 
restricting movement of data to countries without adequate data protection standards). 
8. See id. at cl. 57 (“whereas . . . the transfer of personal data to a third country
which does not provide an adequate level of protection must be prohibited”). 
9. See Convention, supra note 4.
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II. HISTORY OF EVIDENCE GATHERING
A. Conflict Between Civil and Common Law 
In a common law system like the United States, the parties or the
parties’ lawyers conduct the evidence gathering.10  Evidence gathering in 
the United States is pre-trial discovery.11  Pre-trial discovery begins after 
the filing of the lawsuit, and completed before trial starts.12  Requiring
early completion of discovery helps prevent the parties, the attorneys, 
and the judge from being surprised at trial.13 
Even though the time allowance for discovery is limited, the scope is 
very wide.  Discovery in the United States is only limited to “anything 
reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence,” subject to protection
for certain privileges that were available at common law, such as attorney-
client privilege and the work product doctrine.14  The goal behind the
wide scope of common law discovery is the free flow of information, 
truth finding, and informational equity between parties.15 
The judge’s role in discovery is quite limited in a common law system.
Since the parties gather evidence themselves, the judge is there only to 
settle disputes that the parties cannot resolve.16  The disputes settled by 
the judge include whether a privilege exists, whether discovery is likely
to lead to admissible evidence, and whether a party has complied with
10. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery and the Role of the Judge in Civil Law 
Jurisdictions, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1017, 1017–18 (1998). 
11. See id.
12. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d). 
13. See Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery:  A Critique
and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1300 (1978). 
14. See  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) [hereinafter FRCP 26] (“Parties may obtain
discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense-
-including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any
documents or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons who know of
any discoverable matter.; Explanation of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-
Product Doctrine”); FED. R. EVID. 501 [hereinafter FRE 501] (“. . . [t]he privilege of a 
witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by
the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United 
States in the light of reason and experience”).
15. See Hazard, supra note 10, at 1018–19. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (“[These
rules] should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding.”).
16. See Hazard, supra note 10, at 1019. 
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the other party’s request for discovery.17  Judges make these decisions
based on a combination of applicable case law and their own discretion.18 
In a civil law system, the system in most European Union (E.U.)
countries, discovery is very different from a common law system.19 
Discovery does not technically exist in the civil law system, at least not 
as an individualized component of the civil procedural process as it
exists in the United States.20  Instead, civil law is one continuous process
involving meetings, hearings, and written communications, through
which evidence is introduced and evaluated.21  Thus, there are no separate
trial and discovery phases like the United States.22 
The scope of evidence gathering in a civil system is not nearly as broad
as the common law system where the parties conduct the discovery
themselves.23  Generally, the judge plays an active role, compared to the
referee role of the judge in the common law system.24  The judge performs 
the evidence gathering function in a civil law system instead of the
parties or their lawyers.25 The judge also questions the witnesses and 
decides which documents to request, based on the strict adherence to 
codified laws.26 
The differences in the two systems create conflict when litigation in 
one country requires the gathering of evidence from another country
governed by a different legal system.  Litigants in the United States have
nearly unlimited access to all information that might be relevant to a 
17. See id.
18. See  JAMES G. APPLE & ROBERT P. DEYLING, A PRIMER ON THE CIVIL-LAW
SYSTEM 34 (Federal Judicial Center 1995), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/
lookup/CivilLaw.pdf/$file/CivilLaw.pdf. 
19. See id. See also Carla L. Reyes, Note, The U.S. Discovery-EU Privacy Directive 
Conflict: Constructing a Three-Tiered Compliance Strategy, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L 
L. 357, 361–62 (2009). 
20. See APPLE & DEYLING, supra note 18, at 25–28, 35–38. 
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See Reyes, supra note 19, at 361–62. 
24. See id. (“[M]ost civil law countries view evidence gathering as a sovereign
function best carried out by an active judge.”). See also Hazard, supra note 10, at 1022 
(“[I]n the civil law system, the critically important function of exploring and sifting evidence 
is performed by the judge. . . The mind of the judge in a civil law jurisdiction, thus, is the
medium of forensic exploration as well as the medium of forensic determination”).
25. See Reyes, supra note 19, at 362. 
26. See APPLE & DEYLING, supra note 18, at 30 (“The standard image of the civil-law 
judge is one of ‘a civil servant who performs important but essentially uncreative functions.’
The judge’s role is a simple and narrow one, limited by strict notions of legislative supremacy.”). 
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case.27  This broad standard causes a lot of resentment in countries where
evidence gathering is exclusively a judicial function.28 For instance, 
James H. Carter provides: 
Procedures presently permitted by many American courts [are] so completely
alien to the procedures in most other jurisdictions that an attitude of suspicion and 
hostility is created, which sometimes causes discovery which would be considered
proper, even narrow, in this country to be regarded as a fishing expedition
elsewhere.29 
Therefore, foreign countries are very sensitive about the United States
pushing its views and methods of litigation onto them, thus they
compromise to balance the interests of the two opposing views of
litigation.30 
B. International Discovery in the United States Before        
the Hague Convention
Prior to the Hague Convention, there were two ways a party could obtain
evidence from a foreign litigant in U.S. court.  The party wanting information
from abroad could use the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) and 
hope the opposing party had the ability and incentive to provide the 
information.31  Alternatively, a party could issue a letter rogatory to the 
country where the information is located, asking the country’s judiciary
to obtain and provide the requested information or documents.32 
The FRCP is the main method for obtaining evidence in the United 
States.33  Under FRCP 26, parties conduct discovery, usually without an 
intermediary.34  Almost all documents not protected by a specific privilege 
are subject to discovery.35  If the judge finds a party has information
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence 
and not protected by a privilege, he or she can compel that party to 
27. See Reyes, supra note 19, at 361–62. See also FRCP 26, supra note 14. 
28. See Reyes, supra note 19, at 362 (“These two aspects of the discovery process 
give rise to most of the objections raised by civil law countries, which view the scope of
U.S. discovery as intrusive and the identity of the fact-finder inappropriate”). 
29. James H. Carter, Existing Rules and Procedures, 13 INT’L LAW. 5 (1979).
30. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
31. See RALPH G. STEINHARDT, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE RISE OF INTERMESTIC LAW 372 (Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 2002). 
32. See id.
33. See FRCP 26, supra note 14. 
34. See id.
35. The privileges available are the privileges that were available at common law.
See FRE 501, supra note 14. 
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disclose the information.36  If the party fails to comply with the order to 
compel discovery, FRCP 37 grants the court the power to impose 
sanctions.37  It is largely up to the judge’s discretion and interpretation of
case law whether to issue an order to compel discovery or impose
sanctions for noncompliance.38  In cases of international discovery, the 
court has imposed a balancing test of factors to determine whether to 
grant an order.39 
Before the Hague Convention, the best hope of being able take 
evidence abroad was through a letter rogatory.40  A letter rogatory is a 
formal request from a court in one country, to the appropriate judicial 
authorities in another country, for assistance with judicial acts.41  In civil 
litigation, those acts include obtaining testimony, or gathering documents 
or other evidence.  The court of the foreign country executes a letter 
rogatory in accordance with the laws and regulations of that country.42 
The United States courts derive their authority to issue letters rogatory 
from both 28 U.S.C. § 1781 and the courts’ inherent authority.43 
36. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(1) [hereinafter FRCP 37] (“On notice to other parties
and all affected persons, a party may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery.”). 
37. See id. at (b)(2)(A)(“If a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit 
discovery . . . the court where the action is pending may issue further just orders. They may
include the following: 
(i) directing that the matters embraced in the order or other designated facts be taken 
as established for purposes of the action, as the prevailing party claims; 
(ii) prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or
defenses, or from introducing designated matters in evidence; 
(iii) striking pleadings in whole or in part;
(iv) staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed;
(v) dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part;
(vi) rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party; or
(vii) treating as contempt of court the failure to obey any order except an order to
submit to a physical or mental examination.”).
38. See id.
39. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
40. See STEINHARDT, supra note 31, at 372. 
41. See GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS:
COMMENTARY & MATERIALS 893–94 (Kluwer Law Int’l, 2d. ed. 1996). 
42. See id.
43. See id.  See also 28 U.S.C. § 1781(a) (2006) (“The Department of State has
power, directly, or through suitable channels--(1) to receive a letter rogatory issued, or
request made, by a foreign or international tribunal, to transmit it to the tribunal, officer, 
or agency in the United States to whom it is addressed, and to receive and return it after 
execution; and(2) to receive a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by a tribunal in the 
United States, to transmit it to the foreign or international tribunal, officer, or agency to 
whom it is addressed, and to receive and return it after execution.”).
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Letters rogatory have a number of advantages over the FRCP for
obtaining evidence from abroad.  First, a letter rogatory does not conflict 
with civil law beliefs regarding discovery because a foreign judge
presides over the process and decides if the court should comply with the 
request.44  Second, a letter rogatory may compel a witness, who is not
subject to jurisdiction, to testify, something that is not possible under the 
FRCP.45  Third, a letter rogatory may be the only way to obtain evidence 
from a willing witness who cannot travel to the United States to testify 
because of costs or scheduling problems.46 
Many of the same advantages to using letters rogatory also underlie 
the disadvantages of using them.  Since a request has to go through
diplomatic channels, the process usually takes a minimum of three months 
and commonly can take more than a year.47  Another disadvantage of a
letter rogatory is the chance that the foreign court will not grant the 
request.48  Foreign courts have often refused to grant requests for reasons
such as bad relations with the United States, claims that conflict with 
foreign public policy, and “bureaucratic inertia.”49  Even when a foreign 
court executes a letter rogatory, the court still maintains the ability to 
limit the extent it will grant the request.50  Often, these foreign courts do 
limit the scope of discovery granted in comparison to what a U.S. court 
would have ordered.51 
C. The Hague Convention 
The available methods for taking evidence abroad before 1970 were 
inefficient and problematic.52  U.S. lawyers had a longstanding interest
in improving procedures for taking evidence abroad because the FRCP
could not be used in every situation and letters rogatory were often 
ineffective and time consuming.53  Due to these problems, the United 
States took initiative and proposed that nations with conflicting discovery
44. See BORN, supra note 41, at 893. 
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 894. 
48. See id. at 893. 
49. See id.
50. See id. at 894. 
51. See id.
52. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
53. See discussion supra Part II.B.  See also Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale 
v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 530 (1987). 
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philosophies adopt a Hague Evidence Convention54 to address many of 
the shortcomings of the FRCP and letters rogatory.55 
In 1970, the United States signed the Hague Convention.  Legal 
organizations such as the American Bar Association, the Judicial Conference
of the United States, and the National Conference of Commissions on 
Uniform State Laws supported the Hague Convention and there was no 
evidence of any opposition to the Hague Convention in any of the 
organizations.56  The U.S. Senate ratified it in 1972 by unanimous vote.57 
Most members of the E.U., including France, have adopted the Hague 
Convention.58 
According to the Hague Convention explanatory report, “[t]he Hague 
Convention’s purpose was to establish a system for obtaining evidence 
abroad that would be ‘tolerable’ to the state executing the request and 
would produce evidence ‘utilizable’ in the requesting state.”59  The U.S.
Secretary of State’s letter of submittal to the President further outlined 
four purposes for the Hague Convention: 
The [] Hague Convention is designed to (1) [m]ake the employment of letters of
request a principal means of obtaining evidence abroad, (2) [i]mprove the 
means of securing evidence abroad by increasing the powers of consuls and by
introducing in the civil law world, the concept of a commissioner, (3) [p]reserve 
means for securing evidence in the form needed by the court where the action is
pending, and (4) [p]reserve all more favorable and less restrictive practices arising
54. See Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 530. 
55. See id. at 531. The purpose behind the Convention was summarized by the 
Secretary of State’s letter of submittal to the President.  See id. (“The willingness of the 
Conference to proceed promptly with work on the evidence conventions is perhaps 
attributable in large measure to the difficulties encountered by courts and lawyers in
obtaining evidence abroad from countries with markedly different legal systems. Some 
countries have insisted on the exclusive use of the complicated dilatory and expensive 
system of letters rogatory or letters of request. Other countries have refused adequate judicial 
assistance because of the absence of a treaty or convention regulating the matter. The 
substantial increase in litigation with foreign aspects arising, in part from the unparalleled 
expansion of international trade and travel in recent decades had intensified the need for 
an effective international agreement to set up a model system to bridge differences between
the common law and civil law approaches to the taking of evidence abroad.”).
56. See id.
57. See id. at 530. 
58. See id. at 524 n.1 (“The Hague Convention entered into force between the 
United States and France on October 6, 1974.  The Convention is also in force in
Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxemburg,
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.”). 
59. Id. at 530 (citing AMRAM, EXPLANATORY REPORT ON THE CONVENTION ON THE
TAKING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS, S. EXEC. DOC A, p. v). 
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from internal law, internal rules of procedure and bilateral or multilateral Hague 
Conventions.60 
The actual text of the Hague Convention declares its purpose as 
“[d]esiring to facilitate the transmission and execution of Letters of Request
and to improve judicial co-operation in civil or commercial matters.”61 
The Hague Convention delineates two options for conducting discovery
abroad.62  The first option is a letter of request63 which is a formal
process where the judicial authority of the requesting state directs the
request to the designated central authority of the state in which the 
evidence resides.64  The judicial authority that executes a letter of request
applies its own laws on the methods and procedures for taking the 
evidence.65 
One advantage of a letter of request over a letter rogatory is the 
country that receives the request cannot refuse for an arbitrary reason.66 
The central authority can reject the request if they believe the request 
does not comply with the Hague Convention provisions, but they must 
promptly inform the authority of their specific objections.67  The  
requesting authority also has the ability to request a special procedure or 
method, which can only be refused if it is incompatible with the internal 
law of the State of execution or there are other practical difficulties.68 
Finally, a letter of request is less time consuming than a letter rogatory. 
A letter of request takes on average six weeks compared to the three
months to over a year it takes to execute a letter rogatory.69 
The second option under the Hague Convention is for a contracting
state’s diplomatic officer or consular agent to take evidence on his or her 
own in the country where the requestor is seeking evidence.70  The officer 
or agent seeking evidence must have permission from the designated 
authority of the requesting state.71  If the agent or officer has permission, 
60. Id. at 532. 
61. Convention, supra note 4.
62. See id. chs. 1–2. 
63. See id. ch. 1.
64. See id. art. 2.
65. See id. art. 1.
66. See id. art. 5 (“If the Central Authority considers that the request does not
comply with the provisions of the present Convention, it shall promptly inform the authority 
of the State of origin which transmitted the Letter of Request, specifying the objections 
to the letter.”).
67. See id.
68. See id. art. 9.
69. See BORN, supra note 41. 
70. See Convention, supra note 4, ch. 2. 
71. See id. art. 15.
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they may also ask for assistance to obtain the evidence by compulsion.72 
Unlike letters of request, the commissioner takes evidence in accordance
with forms required by the law of the court where the plaintiff initiates 
the action.73  It is also less time-consuming for a commissioner to take 
the evidence because the commissioner does not have to wait for someone
else to move the process along. 
Though the goal of the Hague Convention is to provide a compromise 
for taking evidence between countries with conflicting legal systems, the 
Hague Convention still allows the countries opposed to pre-trial
discovery a way to “opt-out.”74  Article 23 of the Hague Evidence Hague
Convention allows member countries to declare that they will not enforce 
any pre-trial discovery order.75  France is one country that took advantage 
of the opt-out provision. The French law reads:
In accordance with the provisions of Article 33, the French Government declares
that in pursuance of Article 4, para. 2 it will execute Letters of Request only if
they are in French or if they are accompanied by a translation into French; that,
in pursuance of Article 23, Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining
pre-trial discovery of documents as known in Common Law countries will not 
be executed.76 
This law severely limits much of the discovery allowed in common law
systems such as the United States.
III. OBSTACLES TO DISCOVERY SINCE THE HAGUE CONVENTION
Since the Hague Convention was enacted, two types of laws have 
developed in the E.U. which have hindered the Hague Convention’s goal 
of cooperation between civil and common law countries.  The first type 
is a blocking statute.  The statute directly interferes with U.S. discovery 
because of disagreement with American policies.77 The second type is data
privacy statutes.  Data privacy statutes can limit the discovery process
when a requesting country does not meet the standards for data protection.78 
72. See id. art. 18.
73. See id. art. 21(d).
74. Convention, supra note 4.
75. See id. art. 22.
 76. Reyes, supra note 19, at 367 n.63. 
77. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
78. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
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A. Blocking Statutes 
A number of foreign countries have imposed blocking statutes that 
punish their citizens for disclosing information to other countries in
international litigation.79  The first blocking statute was enacted by Canada 
in response to an order of discovery in a grand jury antitrust investigation 
conducted by the United States.80  Soon after, the Netherlands enacted a
similar statute prohibiting compliance with the decision of another 
country regarding anti-competitive practices.81  A common theme among 
these statutes is the protection of litigants from discovery.82 
The French blocking statute is much broader than the Canadian and 
Dutch blocking statutes.83  The statute’s goal is to give French litigants 
an advantage in foreign countries by giving them a reason not to comply
with discovery.84  Article 1 of the blocking statute reads:
Subject to international treaties and agreements, any physical person who is 
of French nationality or habitually resides in French territory, and any manager,
representative, agent or employee of a legal entity which has its registered
office or a place of business in France is prohibited from communicating, in
writing, orally or in any other form, in any place whatsoever, to foreign public
authorities, economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical documents or
information, the communication of which is to infringe upon the sovereignty,
security or essential economic interests of France or upon the public order, as
specified by the administrative authority to the extent that may be required. (Ex.
C to Affidavit of Herbert M. Wachtell, sworn to Oct. 8, 1982).85 
Article 3 of the statute allows for the imposition of criminal penalties of 
up to 120,000 Francs ($20,000) and up to six months in prison.86 
However, there is an exception to the blocking statute if the Hague 
procedures are used.87  Unfortunately, not every country is a member of
the Hague Convention and the United States often uses the FRCP instead
of Hague Convention procedures. 
79. See Erica M. Davila, International E-Discovery: Navigating the Maze, 8 U.
PITT. J. TECH. L. POL’Y 5, 11–14, available at http://tlp.law.pitt.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 
2009/10/e-discovery.pdf. 
80. See id. 
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See French Blocking Statute, supra note 2 (statute not limited to a specific purpose 
like anti-trust, but covers all transfer of information to foreign authorities for any purpose.).
84. See Compagnie Française D’assurance pour le Commerce v. Phillips Petroleum 
Co., 105 F.R.D. 16, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
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B. European Data Protection Statutes 
In addition to blocking statutes, French litigants are also subject to 
European data privacy laws.  The European Union Privacy Directive88 
was created to ensure that all countries who handled the personal data of 
E.U. countries met a minimum level of protection for the privacy of 
data.89  In 1995, the E.U. implemented the united privacy directive called 
Directive 95/46/EC (Privacy Directive).90  All of the member states of 
the E.U. are required to adopt laws that comply with the Privacy 
Directive’s terms.91  The Privacy Directive proposes to protect the transfer
of “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural 
person.”92  The country receiving the data must provide an “adequate 
level of data protection” if the country is not a member of the E.U.93 
The E.U. evaluates adequate levels of protection based on nine different 
factors.94  An E.U. committee evaluates a third party country’s domestic
88. The EU Privacy Directive, see generally Data Protection Directive, supra note 
7, is being used as an example of how data protection statutes hinder discovery, as
opposed to just the German Privacy Laws or just the Swiss secrecy laws, because the 
E.U. Privacy Directive is the most extensive and far reaching.  Data Protection statutes
are addressed separately from broad blocking statutes because data protection statutes 
have been seen to have a legitimate purpose, while the only purpose of broad blocking
statutes is to frustrate discovery.  The two kinds of laws must be addressed differently, 
with more deference given to laws that have a legitimate purpose.
89. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 7, cl. 8 (“[W]hereas, in order to 
remove the obstacles to the flows of personal data, the level of protection of the rights 
and freedoms of individuals with regard to the processing of such data must be equivalent
in all Member States.”).
90. See Reyes, supra note 19, at 358. 
91. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 7, cl. 8–9, 12. 
92. Id. art. 2(a). 
93. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 7, art. 25.
94. The factors that the E.U. considers for evaluating an adequate level of protection
include: (1) maintaining shorter retention periods relative to personal data, (2) achieving 
transparency by giving data holders advance, general notice of the possibility of their 
personal data being processed for litigation and identifying to the data subject any 
recipients of their data, (3) providing notice that the data subjects have the right to object 
to processing including the right (a) to right to object at any time on compelling legitimate
grounds to the processing of data related to the data subject (b) the existence, purpose, 
and functioning of its data processing (c) the recipients of the personal data and (d) the 
right to access, rectification and reassure of the personal data, (4) ensuring that all reasonable 
technical and organization precautions to preserve the security of the data to protect it 
from accidental or unlawful destruction and unauthorized disclosure or access have been
taken by the data controller (5) considering whether personal data should anonymised or at 
least pseudo-anonymised to protect the data subjects identity (6) considering the use of
culling to separate the relevant from irrelevant  (7) considering whether culling may conducted 
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laws, and issues an opinion on whether the country meets the “adequate 
level of protection.”95 
Anyone who violates the Privacy Directive is subject to penalties, 
including a range of fines and imprisonment, depending on the specific 
implementation of the Privacy Directive by the member state where the
violation occurred.96  There is no consistent penalty among the E.U.
member countries because the directive itself is not binding law.  The 
law only requires the E.U. member countries to impose the standards for 
data privacy onto their own laws and leaves the penalties up to the 
specific country.97 
Litigants can face a difficult time complying with the Privacy
Directive98 because the directive places a variety of restrictions on the
processing of personal data.99  First, the directive must be processed 
fairly and lawfully for “specified, explicit, and legitimate” purposes.100 
Second, it must be adequate, relevant, and not excessive in relation to 
the purposes for which they are collected, processed, or both.101  Third,
the directive applies to almost any possible action taken with the data.
This includes, “collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or 
alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission,
dissemination,” and other actions.102  Cumulatively, these restrictions
place a strict limit on the scope of discoverable data.  Specifically, an 
attorney would have a hard time performing any of his or her litigation 
functions without running into one of the actions covered by the statute. 
The E.U. believes the United States does not have an adequate level of 
protection.103  However, there are other options for a litigant in a non-
by a trusted third part in the European Union to reduce the number of personal records to be
processed (8) recognizing that special categories of data such as doctor/patient confidential 
materials, should be managed in exclusive way according to the applicable special 
obligations that apply in those circumstances and (9) recognizing that sensitive personal
data should be managed under article 8. See Moze Cowper & Amor Esteban, E-Discovery, 
Privacy, and the Transfer of Data Across Borders: Proposed Solutions for Cutting the 
Gordian Knot, 10 SEDONA CONFERENCE J. 263, 267–68 (2009). 
95. Data Protection Directive, supra note 7, art. 25. 
96. In one instance, Tyco Healthcare was fined $40,350 for violating France’s data 
protection law. In another GS, a supermarket chain, was fined for violation Italy’s
implementation of the privacy directive. See Reyes, supra note 19, at 358 n.5, 360 n.21. 
97. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 7, cl. 9.
98. See Reyes, supra note 19, at 360. 
99. Id. See also Data Privacy Directive, supra note 7, arts. 6–7. 
100. Data Privacy Directive, supra note 7, art. 6(b). 
101. Id. art. 6(c)
102. Id. art. 2(b).
103. See Reyes, supra note 19, at 360 (citing Working Party, Opinion 10/2006 on
the Processing of Personal Data by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
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compliant country to obtain data from a country covered by the E.U 
without being subject to penalties.  The first approach is to follow the 
Hague Convention procedures.104  If the litigant faces an evidence request 
from a Hague Convention signatory state, the executing authority can
invoke Article 11 of the Hague Convention and refuse to provide any 
information that is in violation of their domestic laws, such as the 
Privacy Directive.105  If the executing country invokes Article 11, it will 
only provide the information that does not violate the Privacy Directive. 
Thus, it is only a partial solution.  If the Hague Convention requires full 
compliance, the requesting country must persuade the E.U. executing
country that the data sought is vital to establish a legal claim or defense 
because the Privacy Directive allows an exception if the transfer is 
necessary for the establishment, exercise, or defense of legal claims.106 
If the Hague Convention procedures are not used, there are other 
options for litigants to obtain data if the litigant does not reside in a 
country with adequate data protection.  One such option is to seek a 
protective order from the court excusing production, which will be 
discussed in greater depth in Part IV of this article.107 
Another possibility for achieving compliance with the Privacy 
Directive is to use the exceptions explicitly set out in the text of the 
Privacy Directive.  The first exception is to transfer the data to an entity
participating in the safe harbor provision.108  The United States negotiated 
a safe harbor with the E.U.109  Under the safe harbor provision, U.S.
companies that adhere to previously agreed upon requirements between
the United States and the E.U. may exchange personal data with
companies in the E.U.110  However, the safe harbor provision is not much
help in discovery.  The safe harbor provision is only meant to allow a 
corporation or entity within an E.U. country to share data directly with a 
Telecommunications (SWIFT), at 21, 01935/06/EN, WP 128 (Nov. 22, 2006) [hereinafter 
WP128]). 
104. See id. at 364. 
105. See id. at 365 (citing Convention, supra note 4, art. 11 (“[i]n the execution of a 
Letter of Request the person concerned may refuse to give evidence in so far as he has a 
privilege or duty to refuse to give the evidence.”)).
106. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 7, art. 26(d).
107. See discussion infra part IV.
108. See Reyes, supra note 19, at 373. 
109. See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Safe Harbor Privacy Principles (July 21, 2000),
www.export.gov/safeharbor/SH_Privacy.asp [hereinafter Safe Harbor].
110. See id.
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corporation or entity in a country outside of the E.U.111  It was not meant
to address transfers involving persons or entities who are outside of the 
corporation. For example, any transfers to opposing counsel of a non-
member country or transfers to a foreign court are additional onward
transfers112 and “specifically prohibited under the terms of the safe
harbor principal.”113 
The other exceptions to the Privacy Directive are found in sections 1 
and 2 of Article 26.114  Section 2 of Article 26 creates exceptions for 
contractual clauses and binding corporate rules.115  A contractual clause
can constitute an adequate safeguard if the two parties split the data
protection compliance and provide additional safeguards for the data.116 
However, contractual clauses are considered unworkable when no 
supervisory body exists in the country receiving the data, or where the 
recipient country possesses power to access information that goes
beyond internationally accepted standards.117  Because of the lack of a
supervisory body in the United States and the broad power litigants have 
to access data in U.S. courts, contractual clauses in the United States will
likely be seen as unworkable.  Binding corporate rules are also ill suited 
for U.S. discovery because they only allow a member of the corporation 
to obtain the information.118  This would not include parties or their
counsel who are not part of the corporation.
The first exception under Section 1 of Article 26 is consent to the
subject of the data.  Consent, however, is not practical in discovery
because it can be withdrawn at any time.119  The other exception under
section 1 is the “establishment, exercise, or defense of legal claims” 
exception.120  The problem with the “defense of legal claims” exception 
is that it can only be used when the Hague Convention is invoked.121 
111. See Reyes, supra note 19, at 373–74. 
112. See id. at 374. 
113. Id.
114. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 7, art. 26.
115. See id. art. 26(2).
116. See Reyes, supra  note 19, at 374–75 (citing Working Party, Working Document on
Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries: Applying Articles 25 & 26 of the EU 
Data Protection Directive, at 16, DG XV D/5025/98, WP 12 (July 24, 1998) [hereinafter
WP 12].
117. See id. at 375 (citing WP 12 at 22–23). 
118. See id. at 375–77. 
119. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 7, art. 26(1). Consent is also problematic 
because U.S. courts generally object to consent being controlled by the will of third parties.
See Reyes, supra note 19, at 379. 
120. Data Protection Directive, supra note 7, art. 26(1)(d). 
121. See Reyes, supra note 19, at 379. 
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IV. U.S. COURTS APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL DISCOVERY
Since Aérospatiale, the only U.S. Supreme Court case that has
addressed when Hague Convention procedures should be used, the 
Hague Convention has generally lost to the FRCP when it comes to 
choosing a method for discovery.122  In Aérospatiale, the Supreme Court 
held that the Hague Convention was an optional method for taking
evidence abroad and imposed a balancing test; requiring lower courts to 
weigh the interest of the United States in production of data versus the 
foreign country’s interest in using Hague Convention procedures.123 The
Court articulated a similar balancing test to determine whether to issue a 
protective order.124  In most instances, the lower U.S. courts have refused 
to grant protection for litigants who are subject to blocking statutes.125 
U.S. courts are more lenient when they consider the foreign state’s 
interest legitimate.126 
A. Balancing Test for International Comity 
U.S. courts have struggled with the issue of when to compel discovery
of foreign located documents long before the Hague Convention.  In 
Societe Internationale, Interhandel (also known as Society Internationale) 
sought to recover assets taken by the United States under the Trading 
with Enemy Act.127  The U.S. government compelled Interhandel to produce
a large number of banking records for inspection under FRCP 34.128 
Interhandel, a Swiss Corporation, refused to supply the documents because
“disclosure of bank records would violate Swiss penal laws, and therefore,
might lead to criminal sanctions, including fine and imprisonment.”129 
The U.S. district court dismissed the recovery action for noncompliance 
with the discovery order.130  The U.S. Supreme Court held it was an error 
to dismiss the case because the noncompliance was due to inability, not
122. See generally Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 
482 U.S. 522 (1987). 
123. See id. at 542–44. 
124. See id. at 545–46. 
125. See discussion infra part IV.C.
126. See discussion infra part IV.C.
127. See Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A.
v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 198–99 (1958). 
128. See id. at 199–200. 
129. See id. at 200. 
130. See id.
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bad faith.131  In spite of the Court’s acceptance of the excuse, the Court 
held that the inability of Interhandle to produce the information would 
remain a serious handicap in proving its case and the trial court could 
draw unfavorable inferences because of the missing information.132 
After Societe Internationale, three Second Circuit decisions emphasized
the importance of considering whether or not the order compelling
production of documents in violation of foreign law violates principles 
of international comity in addition to the good or bad faith of the party
opposing discovery.133  In other words, “our courts . . . should not take
any action as may cause a violation of the laws of a friendly neighbor or, 
at the least, an unnecessary circumvention of its procedures.”134  The  
Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
created the first balancing test for international comity.135  The five  
factors of the test include: (1) the vital national interests of each of the
states; (2) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent 
enforcement actions would impose upon the person; (3) the extent to
which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other 
state; (4) the nationality of the person; and (5) the extent to which
enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be expected to 
achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by the state.136 
U.S. courts almost immediately began using this balancing test after 
its publication, but have failed to apply the factors consistently.137  At least
one court has used a three-part balancing test that includes one factor
131. See id. at 212. 
132. See id.
133. See In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611, 612–13 (2d Cir. 1962)
(refusing to order production of documents based upon principles of international comity);
Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 152–53 (2d Cir. 1960); First Nat’l City Bank v. IRS, 271 
F.2d 616, 619 (2d Cir. 1959) (holding that the production of documents should not be 
ordered when it would require violating Panamanian law). 
134. Ings, 282 F.2d at 619. 
135. See  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 40 (1962).  See also Keith Y. Cohan, Note, The Need For a Refined Balancing
Approach When American Discovery Orders Demand the Violation of Foreign Law, 87 
TEX. L. REV. 1009, 1017 (2009). 
136. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 135. 
137. See Cohan, supra note 135, at 1017 n.46. See, e.g., United States v. First Nat’l
City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968). 
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from the Second Restatement and two factors of its own creation.138  Other 
courts use the full test, but vary on which factors are given greater weight.139 
The Third Restatement introduced a new balancing test, referenced by
the Supreme Court in Aérospatiale.140  In a footnote in Aérospatiale, the 
Court mentioned the five factors from the Restatement that make up 
most balancing tests that courts now use.141  These factors are:
(1) importance to the litigation of the documents or other information requested;
(2) the degree of the specificity of the request; (3) whether the information originated
in the United States; (4) the availability of alternative means of securing the
information; (5) and the extent to which noncompliance with the request would
undermine important interests of the United States, or compliance with the request 
would undermine important interests of the state where the information is located.142 
However, the Supreme Court’s reference to the Third Restatement 
balancing test did nothing to unify the different tests lower courts use.
For example, some lower courts continue to use the original Second 
Restatement test.143  Others use the Third Restatement test but supplement 
it with Second Restatement Factors.144  Finally, some courts use a
combination of both tests plus the good faith approach originally stated
in Societe Internationale.145  In some situations, all these approaches
have led to a seven or eight factor test being applied to issues of 
international comity, with no guide on how the test should be applied or 
what weight should be assigned to each factor.146 
138. See In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980) (implementing
a three-part balancing test using the likelihood of enforcement of sanction while adding 
two of the court’s own factors: the importance of the policies underlying the U.S. substantive 
law and the importance of the requested documents to the litigation).
139. See United States v. Field (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 532 F.2d 404, 408
(5th Cir. 1976) (emphasizing the vital interest of each of states as the key factor).
140. See  Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v.U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 
522, 544 n.28 (1987) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 437 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1987) (current version at § 442)).
141. See id.
142. Id.
143. See discussion supra part V.A. 
144. See Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1478–79 
(9th Cir. 1992) (using the Third Restatement approach but adding the extent-of-hardship
factor and likelihood-of-compliance factor in its balancing analysis). 
145. See Cohan, supra note 135, at 1020.  See also Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 
242 F.R.D 199, 211 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 463 F. Supp. 2d 310, 
314–15 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
146. Cohan, supra note 135, at 1025. 
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B. International Comity and the Hague Convention 
In Aérospatiale, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Hague Convention
was optional.147  The Court decided that the decision to resort to the Hague
Convention should be weighed the same way a decision to issue a 
production order was weighed, on the basis of international comity.148  In
Aérospatiale, the petitioner, a French manufacturer, sought a protective 
order from having to produce documents that could only be found in
France.149  The petitioner argued that because the documents existed 
only in France, a foreign nation, the documents must be obtained 
through Hague Convention procedures.150 
The Court listed four ways to view the relationship between discovery 
under the FRCP and the Hague Convention: (1) exclusive use of the 
Hague Convention for taking evidence abroad; (2) turning first to the 
Hague Convention to take evidence but not exclusive relying on the 
Hague Convention; (3) optional use of the Hague Convention, but
concerns of international comity require looking to the Hague Convention
first; and (4) use of the Hague Convention procedures when American
courts consider it appropriate after considering the interests of all parties 
to the suit and the foreign state.151  While the Court agreed with the
petitioner that both the FRCP and the Hague Convention were valid law, 
the Court ruled that the Hague Convention was an optional procedure 
and did not have to be applied in the present case.152 
The Court also rejected the idea of requiring first resort to Hague 
Convention procedures, holding a case-by-case comity analysis was the 
appropriate method for determining whether to apply the Hague 
Convention.153  The Court rejected a first resort rule because Letters of 
Request would be “unduly time consuming” and “less certain to produce 
needed evidence than direct use of the Federal Rules.”154  The Court’s  
majority gave a number of reasons for their conclusion that the Hague 
Convention was optional, but was ultimately convinced by the text of the 
Hague Convention. Specifically, the Hague Convention states that it 
“may” be used for letters of request and consuls, not “must.”155 The
147. See  Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v.U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 
522, 531 (1987)
148. See id.
149. See id. at 525–26. 
150. See id. at 528. 
151. See id. at 533. 
152. See id. at 538. 
153. See id. at 542. 
154. See id.
155. See id. at 535. 
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Court said, “the absence of any command that a contracting state must
use Convention procedures when they are not needed is conspicuous.”156 
C. Applying the Balancing Test 
When U.S. courts decide whether to use the Hague Convention or issue
a protective order in cases not involving Hague Convention signatories, 
the decision usually hinges on the foreign interest factor of the balancing
test.157  When a court finds that a statute preventing discovery of foreign
located data has a legitimate interest in doing so, the court will resort to
the Hague Convention or issue a protective order.158  In Aérospatiale, the
Court held, whether or not a foreign blocking statute was grounds for a 
protective discovery was a question to be considered under the “interest 
of the foreign state” factor in a comity analysis.159  When applying a
particular statue to the “interest of the foreign state” factor, the Court 
held that statutes that frustrate the goal of obtaining the best available
evidence “need not be given the same deference by courts of the United
States as substantive rules of law at variance with the laws of the United 
States.”160  Specifically, the Court held that “it is well settled” that a 
blocking statute “does not deprive an American Court of the power to
order a party subject to its jurisdiction to produce evidence even though 
the act of production may violate that statute.”161 
Courts usually do not consider blocking statutes, specifically the 
French statute, to be a legitimate interest of the foreign state and are 
unlikely to be enforced.  A number of U.S. district courts have specifically
addressed whether the French blocking statute precludes production of
documents.162  In Compagnie Francaise d’Assurance Pour le Commerce 
Exterieur v. Phillips Petroleum Com., a U.S. district court considered
whether a French plaintiff in a U.S. court could be compelled to provide 
156. See id.
157. See discussion infra part IV.C.
158. See discussion infra part IV.C.
159. Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.29. 
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See Bodner v. Paribas, 202 F.R.D. 370, 375 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that the 
French Blocking Statute did not represent a significant interest of France because it was
enacted specifically to give French litigants an advantage in foreign courts); Valois of
Am., Inc. v. Risdon Corp., 183 F.R.D. 344 (D. Conn. 1997) (declining to apply French
Blocking Statute). 
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documents that fell under the French blocking statute.163  The plaintiff 
requested a waiver of the statute by the French government but only
received a waiver for some of the documents.164  Under the national
interests factor, the court noted at first the French interest seemed to be 
substantial, but closer inspection revealed that “it was never expected
nor intended to be enforced against French subjects but was intended
rather to provide them with tactical weapons and bargaining chips in
foreign courts.”165  Although the litigant had a made a good faith effort to
obtain a waiver, the court still would not issue a protective order because 
the court did not find the French interest to be valid.166  The court performed
a similar analysis for the hardship factor; however, the court found that
the “plaintiffs’ fears . . . appear[ed] to have no sound basis.  There [was] 
little evidence that the statute has been or will be enforced.”167 
A number of other U.S. district courts applied the same reasoning as 
that in Compagnie and refused to allow the French blocking statute to
preclude document production. For example, in a securities fraud class
action in the Southern District of New York, the court granted plaintiffs’ 
motion to compel a nonparty, Lazard Group LLC (Lazard), to provide 
documents located in France.168  Judge Pitman observed that although 
Lazard had been threatened with prosecution by two French agencies,
there was little likelihood that the threats would be carried out.169  The 
“speculative possibility of prosecution” was “insufficient to displace the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”170 
Despite the general lack of respect for the French blocking statute, it
has received deference by U.S. courts on a few occasions.171  In In re
Perrier Bottled Water Litigation, defendant Source Perrier sought a 
court order requiring the plaintiffs to utilize the procedures established 
163. See Compagnie Française D’assurance pour le Commerce v. Phillips Petroleum 




167. Id. (“It is inconceivable that Law No. 80-538 is to be taken at face value as a 
blanket criminal prohibition against exporting evidence for use in foreign tribunals.  For
if it were, French nationals doing business abroad would be at the mercy of their business
counterparts: they would be unable to redress breaches as frauds committed by suit
in foreign courts since they would be barred from supporting their claims with their 
documents.”).
168. See Liberty Media Corp. v. Vivendi Universal S.A. (In re Vivendi Universal, 
S.A. Secs. Litig), 618 F.Supp.2d 335, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
169. See id. at 342 (“Indeed, it is not clear that any court would have jurisdiction to 
try E & Y-U.S. for violations of French law.  Absent a realistic threat of prosecution,
there is no hardship for E & Y-U.S. to production.”). 
170. Id.
171. See In re Perrier Bottled Water Litig., 138 F.R.D. 348, 355 (D. Conn. 1991). 
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by the Hague Convention in seeking discovery of information in Source 
Perrier’s possession or control.172  The court found that although it does
not usually grant requests for using the Hague Convention, a grant in 
this case was in line with French interests finding: 
Although not all civil-law countries have expressed their disfavor of private 
litigants’ use of the Federal Rules’ procedures within its borders, of those which
have, France has been among the most emphatic.  Indeed, as defendants point
out, and as the Court has earlier described in part, France has even amended its
civil and penal codes to incorporate the Hague Convention, and proscribe foreign
litigants’ use of alternative, unauthorized procedures.  The simple fact that, in
joining the Hague Convention, France has consented to its procedures is an
expression of France’s sovereign interests and weighs heavily in favor of the 
use of those procedures.173 
Litigants have generally had better luck convincing courts that data 
protection statutes serve a legitimate foreign interest as opposed to 
blocking statutes.174  In Volkswagen A.G. v. Valdez, the real parties sought
production of Volkswagen A.G.’s (VWAG) current corporate telephone
book to identify individuals who might have relevant information
concerning defects in the automobile’s door latches.175  VWAG objected 
to this request because of the German Federal Data Protection Act,
which prohibits the dissemination of private information without the 
consent of the individuals.176  The court applied the factors for international 
comity and concluded that there was a definite danger of a violation of
German law and interests.177  The court concluded that, “as asserted by 
Germany in its amicus curiae brief, its interests would be undermined if 
VWAG complied with the real parties’ request for production.”178  The 
court found that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering production




174. See, e.g., Salerno v. Lecia, Inc., No. 97-CV-973S(H) 1999 WL 299306 at *3
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 1999); Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 
517, 527–28 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that the Swiss Bank Secrecy Law protected the 
substantial interest in the protection of bank client account information); Volkswagen, 
A.G. v. Valdez, 909 S.W.2d 900, 902 (Tex. 1995). 
175. See Valdez, 909 S.W.2d at 901. 
176. See id.
177. See id. at 902–03. 
178. Id. at 903. 
179. See id.
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Similarly, in Salerno v Lecia, Inc., the plaintiff sought production of
Lecia, Inc.’s severance package information and personnel files.180 
Lecia asserted that it could not disclose the documents because of E.U. and 
German data protection laws.  The court found that Lecia’s interpretation
of the German Data Protection Laws was reasonable because: (1) the 
courts in E.U. countries consider the U.S. safeguards for the maintenance 
of personal data within the United States as insufficient; (2) the non-
party European Lecia entities had no legal obligation to comply with 
defendant’s request to produce severance and personnel documents; and 
(3) there were serious legal ramifications for those entities that disclosed
personal information in contravention of E.U. and German data 
protection laws.181 
V. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL 
DISCOVERY
A. The Hague Convention Does Not Reconcile Differences Between
Common and Civil Law Evidence Gathering 
1. The Hague Convention Fails to Reconcile Differences Between 
Common and Civil Law Because it is Rarely 
Used in U.S. Courts 
The Hague Convention had several purported purposes but essentially
“establishe[d] methods to reconcile the differing legal philosophies of
Civil Law and Common Law with respect to taking of evidence.”182  The
United States initiated the Hague Convention and had no objection to it 
at the time of ratification.183  The Hague Convention was supposed to
serve the long-term interests of the United States by furthering the 
climate of cooperation and goodwill necessary to the functioning of legal
and commercial systems.184 
The U.S. Supreme Court has hindered this goal of cooperation by 
interpreting the Hague Convention as optional.185  Since the FRCP is the 
default method used in international discovery, the Hague Convention
180. See Salerno v. Lecia, Inc., No. 97-CV-973S(H) 1999 WL 299306 at *1 
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 1999). 
181. See id.
182. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
183. See  Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 
522, 531 (1987) (citing Statement of Carl. F. Salans, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department 
of State, Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad, S. Exec. Rep. No. 92–95, at 3 (1972)). 
184. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
185. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
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does not reconcile different legal philosophies.  The Hague Convention
was created so an acceptable method would exist for the United States to
obtain evidence in foreign countries.186  The United States does nothing
to further the climate of cooperation and goodwill when it bypasses a 
negotiation that it agreed on and automatically invokes its own procedures,
which are offensive to countries who follow a civil system.  As Justice
Blackmun said in his dissent in Aérospatiale: 
The civil law nations committed themselves to employ more effective procedures
for gathering evidence within their borders, even to the extent of requiring some 
common-law practices alien to their systems . . . As a result, the primary benefit
the other signatory nations would have expected in return for their concessions was 
that the United States would respect their territorial sovereignty by using the Hague
Convention procedures.187 
2. Article 23 is Viewed as an Obstacle to U.S. Discovery 
The Hague Convention also fails to achieve its purpose because of the
opt-out provision of Article 23.188  Article 23 allows a signatory to the 
Hague Convention to opt out of all pre-trial discovery as the United 
States understands pre-trial discovery. The Hague Convention fails to
reconcile common and civil law evidence gathering if it allows a country
to refuse a major portion of what the United States considers an essential
part of the litigation process.189 
If Article 23 was not meant to allow a country to opt out of all U.S. 
style pre-trial discovery, then Article 23 still interferes with the purpose 
of the Hague Convention because its wording fails to convey its original 
intent.  Justice Blackmun, in his dissent in Aérospatiale, understood the
majority’s problem with automatically resorting to the Hague Convention
if Article 23 allowed a country to refuse all pre-trial discovery requests.190 
The dissent argued that pre-trial discovery was understood as something 
186. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
187. Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 550–51 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part). 
188. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 7, at art. 23.
189. See Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 536–37 (“Surely, if the Convention had been 
intended to replace completely the broad discovery powers that the common-law courts in
the United States previously exercised over foreign litigants subject to their jurisdiction,
it would have been most anomalous for the common-law contracting parties to agree to
Article 23, which enables a contracting party to revoke its consent to the treaty’s procedures
for pre-trial discovery.”).
190. See id. at 563–64 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
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completely different in civil law countries.191  Since there is no separate
trial phase from discovery in civil law, the dissent asserted that civil law 
countries thought pre-trial discovery meant discovery before a suit was 
initiated.192  According to a United States Delegate Report, a French
commentator understood the pre-trial discovery exception as a 
reinforcement of the rule in Article 1 of the Hague Convention that a 
letter of request “shall not be used to obtain evidence, which is not
intended for use in judicial proceedings, commenced or contemplated.”193 
The U.S. courts do not trust that parties will be able to get much of the 
information that is available normally through the FRCP because of a 
lack of a clear definition of pre-trial discovery, which hinders cooperation 
between the two systems.
B. Balancing Test Fails in Theory and Application
The balancing test for international comity is problematic because it 
encroaches on powers normally reserved for the executive and legislative 
branches.194  The U.S. Constitution gives the executive branch the power 
to negotiate treaties, and the legislative branch the power to sign them
into law.195  The executive branch normally decides when a course of 
action is important enough to risk offending another nation.  The courts 
are not equipped to balance the interests of the foreign nations against
the interests of the United States because they have not developed that 
expertise through diplomatic negotiations.196 
The Hague Convention is the result of the best efforts of the executive 
and legislative branches to balance opposing international interests.197 
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 565 n.21 (citing Gouguenheim, Convention sur l’obtention des preuves à
l’étranger en matière civil ou commerciale, 96 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 315,
319 (1969)).
194. See id. at 551–52. See also Jack Garvey, Judicial Foreign Policy Making in
International Civil Litigation: Ending the Charade of Separation of Powers, 24 LAW &
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 461, 485–87 (1993). 
195. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 cl. 3. 
196. See Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 552–53 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part). See also Margaret A. Niles, Note, Judicial Balancing of Foreign Policy 
Considerations: Comity and Errors Under the Act of State Doctrine, 35 STAN. L. REV. 
327, 345 (1983) (“The resources of the State Department and other arms of the President 
and Congress are designed specifically to gather and evaluate information, and to create 
and implement foreign policy.  The expertise gained from the regular gathering and
analyzing of large amounts of information thus favors deference to the political branches
in cases that bear upon foreign affairs.”). 
197. See Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. 552–53 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). 
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When the parties in a suit are already signatories to the Hague
Convention, there is no need to engage in a comity analysis because 
those concerns have already been resolved by the negotiation of the 
treaty.198  It might be appropriate to apply an international comity
analysis when there is no treaty in place to decide the issues, but when 
there is a treaty on point, it is inappropriate to weigh the issues already 
considered in the treaty to decide whether the treaty should be applied in 
the first place.  The United States government’s interests are much
broader than those of U.S. courts.  The executive branch is responsible
for and best equipped for balancing those interests because the executive
branch has been handling international issues since its inception.199  The
executive branch has more experience than the courts in weighing the 
pros and cons of a diplomatic position. One circuit court even 
acknowledged that the interest balancing approach was an example of 
the judiciary “grasping in the political sphere, incompatible with the 
function of [A]rticle III courts.”200  The court refused any argument that
the judiciary had the ability to refuse to apply established U.S. law.201 
There is also a risk of bias against the United States when a balancing 
test is used. Courts will often defer to the more familiar procedures of 
their local rules.202  The tendency of courts is to view a problem from a
local perspective.203  Thus, a large number of courts resort to the FRCP
for discovery when the Hague Convention is an option.  Ignoring the 
Hague Convention and resorting to the FRCP can hurt foreign 
relations.204  As Justice Blackmun said in his dissent in Aérospatiale, 
“Foreign acquiescence to orders that ignore the Hague Convention 
however is likely to carry a price tag of accumulating resentment, with
198. See id.
199. See id. See also Niles, supra note 196, at 345–47. 
200. Reinsurance Co. of Am. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275,
1280 (7th Cir. 1990). 
201. See id. at 1279. 
202. See Garvey, supra note 194, at 485 (“As courts and commentators have more
recently observed in reviewing the results under interest-balancing tests, whether these 
tests are applied to decide extraterritorial jurisdiction or forum non-conveniens, U.S 
courts have shown a parochial bias.  They decide in favor of a U.S forum except where 
U.S. interests are de minimis.”). 
203. See Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 553 n.4 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part) (citing Pour Participation Industrielles et Commercialies, S.A. v. Rogers, 357
U.S. 197, 204–06 (1968)). 
204. See discussion supra Part IV.C. 
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the predictable long-term political cost that cooperation will be withheld 
in other matters.”205 
The balancing test is also unwieldy, inconsistent, and difficult to 
apply.206  For example, the test for international comity has not been
consistently applied across federal courts.207  Some courts use three
factors, some use five, some use seven or eight.208  In addition, neither
the Restatement of Foreign Law Relations or the courts have given any
guidance on how much weight to apply to the factors.209  This lack of
predictability makes it very difficult for litigants to prepare a case and
accurately forecast what a court will do in any given situation.  The 
balancing test is not any easier for judges to apply than it is for litigants 
to argue. Judge Easterbrook declared in Reinsurance Co. of America
that “[he] would be most reluctant to accept an approach that calls on the
district judge to throw a heap of factors on a table and then slice and dice 
to taste.”210 
C. Litigants are Forced to Choose Between Sanctions in United States 
or Criminal Liability at Home 
The last major problem with the state of international discovery in 
U.S. courts is that litigants can often be faced with the choice between
being sanctioned by U.S. courts for refusing to comply with discovery or 
being subject to criminal liability at home for violating statutes 
preventing discovery.211  The court will issue protective orders on some 
occasions when the foreign interest is legitimate, but there is no 
guarantee.212  Even if protection is guaranteed, it still results in inequities 
to foreign litigants whose countries do not have statutes protecting them 
from discovery.  Protective orders are also unfair to U.S. litigants who
need the information to adjudicate their cases.
Data protection statues have generally enjoyed greater protection from 
U.S. discovery orders than other statutes impeding discovery, but there 
205. Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 568 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
206. See Cohan, supra note 135, at 1024–27. 
207. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
208. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
209. See Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.28 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 437 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1987)
(current version at § 442)). 
210. Reinsurance Co. of Am. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275,
1283 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., concurring). 
211. See discussion supra Part IV.C. 
212. See discussion supra Part IV.C. 
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is no guarantee the court will always find that there is a legitimate
interest.213  There are still inequities to litigants whose countries do not
have data protection statutes. If the court chooses not to recognize a data 
protection statute as a legitimate interest, there are not many options for
obtaining the data without violating the statute and subjecting the litigant 
to penalties.  One option would be to convince the E.U. that the 
information was needed for a legal proceeding, but that option involves
using the Hague Convention, which is not routinely used in U.S. 
courts.214  The other options, such as safe harbor, consent, contractual
rules, and binding corporate rules, are all impractical for discovery 
because those options were intended for the exchange of information 
between companies, not litigants.215 
Convincing a U.S. court that a protective order is appropriate is more 
difficult when a litigant faces liability because of a blocking statute, as 
opposed to when a litigant faces liability because of a data protection
statute. U.S. courts have given two reasons for refusing to grant
protective orders for discovery of data when the French blocking statute 
controls the data at issue.  First, the French blocking statute is not a
legitimate interest of a foreign state because the sole purpose of the 
statute is to frustrate discovery.216  There is no legitimate interest like the
privacy interest that data protection statutes protect.217  Second, courts
have refused to give the French blocking statute weight in the balancing
test because it lacks authority over French citizens.  U.S. courts have 
said, since the French blocking statute was only meant as a bargaining 
chip, it was never likely to be enforced by the French Government
against its own citizens.218 
Recently, in 2007, France began to enforce its blocking statute.219  A
French case, involving the French mutual insurance company, MAAF, 
and the California Insurance Department gave the statute more authority.220 
213. See discussion supra Part IV.C. 
214. See discussion supra Part IV.C. 
215. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
216. See discussion supra Part IV.C. 
217. See discussion supra Part IV.C. 
218. See discussion supra Part IV.C. 
219. See French Blocking Statute Still Gets No Respect from U.S. Court, MORGAN,
LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP (Dec. 15, 2009), http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/eData_French 
BlockingStatute_LF_15dec09.pdf. 
220. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Dec.
12, 2007, Bull. crim., No. 07-83228 (Fr.), available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affich 
 291
































     
In MAAF, a French lawyer, working with an American law firm
representing the California Department of Insurance, made a telephone
call in an attempt to informally obtain information from MAAF.  MAAF
was a defendant in the then-pending Executive Life litigation in federal
court in Los Angeles.221  The French court found that the lawyer had
violated the blocking statute and fined him 10,000 Euro.222 
The current enforcement of blocking statutes gives French litigants in
U.S. courts stronger arguments for the issuance of protective orders. 
However, the current enforcement creates a problem because the
underlying reason for the statute still frustrates the discovery process.  In 
Compagnie, a case decided before MAAF, the court implied even if the 
blocking statute was enforced, the risk of criminal penalty would not 
weigh heavily enough for the “interest of the foreign country” factor to
weigh in favor of France.223  Since  MAAF, there has been at least one
instance where a U.S. court followed the reasoning of Compagnie and 
refused to issue a protective order in the face of possible liability under 
the French blocking statute.224 
French litigants do not have clear guidance for what to do when faced 
with document production requests.  If the litigants choose to give up the 
documents, it is possible that they will be subject to criminal liability.
However, if the litigants refuse to provide the data, it is still possible that 
they could face sanctions and dismissal by U.S courts. 
Even if the United States allows the French blocking statute to
preclude evidence production in U.S. courts in some instances, which
seems unlikely, this preclusion will still lead to inequity for litigants 
whose data resides in a country without an enforced blocking statute. 
There is an incentive for companies to keep their data in France if they
have that ability or luxury if courts start recognizing the statute as a valid 
excuse for document production. Companies or litigants who cannot 
store their data in France will have to produce all of their data.225 





223. See Compagnie Française D’assurance pour le Commerce v. Phillips Petroleum 
Co., 105 F.R.D. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
224. See In re Global Power Equip. Grp., Inc., 418 B.R. 833, 851 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2009) (holding that a comity analysis weighed in favor of compliance with the FRCP,
even at the cost of possible penalties under the French Blocking Statute).
225. Foreign litigants who do not reside in countries with blocking statutes will have no 
choice but to comply with discovery requests or risk dismissal. 
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more cumbersome and expensive process anytime they want to enter 
into litigation with a French litigant. 
VI. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
A. Convince the Supreme Court to Overrule Aérospatiale
If the Supreme Court overruled Aérospatiale and held that the Hague 
Convention must be applied first in taking discovery abroad, it would
solve the problems of the subjectivity of the balancing tests and the 
unpredictability of when a U.S. court will choose to apply the Hague 
Convention. Then litigants could ascertain ahead of time what standards 
will be used for discovery and plan accordingly.  Applying the Hague 
Convention first would also eliminate the separation of powers and
application problems courts face when applying the balancing test. 
However, overruling Aérospatiale is not a perfect solution. One 
problem with overruling Aérospatiale is that it would be difficult to 
achieve. It is difficult to overturn a major Supreme Court case because
of the doctrine of stare decisis.  In addition, none of the Court’s underlying
reasonings will have changed. The wording of the Hague Convention 
and the legislative history are still the same which would likely lead to 
the same result; the Hague Convention is only an option.  The current 
Supreme Court Justices would have to be convinced that it should look
to the intent of the Hague Convention and the difficulty it faces in
achieving its stated purpose to overcome the plain language of the treaty.
Overruling Aérospatiale causes a second problem; it falls short in
addressing all the problems with the current state of international 
discovery.  The end result would make it simpler for litigants as they
would know what to expect, but there would still be problems. U.S. 
litigants still have no solution for situations where discovery imposes on 
France’s right to opt out of pre-trial discovery procedures.  Also, it is 
unclear whether a litigant would still be able to convince the E.U. that 
discovery through the Hague Convention is in line with the Data Privacy
Directive.
B. Bright Line Rule for Protection from Criminal Sanctions 
Another possible judicial solution to address the difficulty in applying 
the current balancing test is for the Supreme Court to implement a bright 
line rule that protective orders are to be issued whenever a foreign 
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litigant in U.S. court faces criminal sanctions at home.  Implementation
of the rule would eliminate the problem created by France enforcing its
blocking statute.  A French litigant would no longer have to be concerned 
about whether to comply with a U.S. discovery order or the French
blocking statute. 
The problem with a bright line rule is that it would still result in 
inequities to litigants who do not reside or cannot store data in a country
that does not have a blocking statute protecting data from discovery. 
The solution would be just as incomplete as overruling Aérospatiale due 
to these inequities. A bright line rule also fails to advance the goal of 
promoting cooperation between civil and common law systems through 
the Hague Convention. The free flow of information is essential to 
resolving disputes.  If a litigant cannot obtain information stored in 
a country with a blocking statute or data protection statute, many
international suits in U.S. courts will be partially hindered or completely
useless.
C. Modify the Balancing Test
A commentator on the issue suggested that the solution is to modify
the balancing test.226  He proposed using the “specificity of the request”
and “availability of alternatives” factors alone to decide whether to issue 
a discovery order.227  Then he suggested not considering the “foreign 
interests factor” until it comes time to decide whether to issue sanctions, 
and if sanctions are issued, which ones to impose.  This suggestion is 
clearly better than the inconsistent variety of factors that courts are
currently using because it simplifies the balancing test and makes the
test more predictable for litigants.  In addition, delaying the application
of the foreign interest factor until production has been ordered, limits the 
instances where U.S. courts have to perform a sensitive foreign versus
U.S. interest balancing.  The major problem with this approach is it is
still does not give proper respect to the executive and legislative 
branches and the Hague Convention.  It also does not offer much
protection to parties who are subject to criminal penalties from being
subject to sanctions beyond their control. 
226. See Cohan, supra note 135, at 1033–36. 
227. Id. at 1033–34. 
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VII. PROPOSED SOLUTION: MODIFY THE HAGUE CONVENTION
The best option for addressing the current problems with international 
discovery is to attack the problem at its source by altering or amending
the Hague Convention.  The Hague Convention could be rewritten to be 
mandatory instead of permissive.  This revision would avoid the issue of 
the possibility of the Supreme Court overturning precedent.  The 
revision would also address any separation of powers issues with the 
balancing test because the concerns for balancing the needs of different
countries would again be in the hands of the executive and legislative 
branches.  The French blocking statute would also no longer be a concern 
because France allows for discovery through the Hague Convention.228 
Rewriting the treaty will not be easy. One difficulty is that rewriting 
the treaty is more of a long-term solution than any other options.  Rewriting 
a treaty is not as simple as modifying a balancing test or imposing a 
bright-line rule.  Although this process will be lengthy, it will more fully 
address the issues than any of the other proposed solutions.  The long-
term solution will address problems at their source and be effective for a 
long time into the future.  Another problem will be convincing countries 
to give up criminal liability for blocking and data protection statutes.
Foreign governments are likely to be willing to do this if they know that 
all countries will be required to resort to the Hague Convention first in 
matters of international discovery.  There are also issues with the time 
and expense of using the Hague Convention as opposed to the FRCP. 
Using a letter of request might take more time than it takes to implement
a party-to-party request, but the benefits will be worth it if using Hague 
Convention procedures fosters a sense of trust among civil and common 
law countries that leads to more cooperation in the future.  Also, using a 
letter of request might not even be significantly more time consuming
than the FRCP and, therefore, using the Hague Convention instead of the 
FRCP may prove less problematic in practice.  The dissent in Aérospatiale
argued that the majority assumed resorting to the Hague Convention 
takes more time, but no data was ever offered to back it up.229  The  
dissent also pointed out that the majority only discussed using letters of 
228. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
229. See Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 
522, 554–55 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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request but never evaluated using the second option in the Hague 
Convention: consuls from the requesting country take the evidence in the 
foreign land.230 
The final and possibly the greatest problem with rewriting the treaty is 
the seeming lack of incentive for the United States to rewrite the treaty.
On the surface there may not appear to be any incentive for the United
States to agree to rewriting the Hague Convention when courts can just
require all litigants to abide by the FRCP, but there are diplomatic
reasons for agreeing to rewrite the Hague Convention.  First, when the 
United States originally entered into the Hague Convention the United 
States had reasons for wanting to cooperate with European countries,
such as providing U.S. litigants with a guaranteed way to gain access to 
data residing in foreign countries.  At the time the Hague Convention 
was entered into, the U.S. executive and legislative branches could easily
have not entered into the treaty and let courts require the imposition of the
FRCP on foreign litigants subject to sanctions and dismissal.  The 
United States attempted to cooperate with foreign methods of discovery
for diplomatic reasons.  Those same diplomatic reasons most likely still 
exist today. A second incentive for rewriting the Hague Convention is 
that if the United States respects foreign and international discovery
practices, foreign businesses will feel more secure doing business with
the United States, resulting in increased international trade and global 
economic output.231  Finally, by agreeing to the Hague Convention as a
first resort, the United States increases the likelihood that U.S. litigants 
in E.U. courts will be treated fairly and consistently. 
A. Explicitly Specify the Hague Convention be Used First 
The Hague Convention needs to be the option of first resort for all 
international discovery requests.  This alteration solves a number of 
problems with the current situation.  First, it addresses all of the 
problems when the Hague Convention was optional.  By making the Hague 
Convention the first resort, it will achieve the cooperation originally
intended. Second, it eliminates the balancing test, which will solve both 
the application problems and the separation of powers issues.  Making 
the Hague Convention the first resort will also dispel with most of the 
problems with the French blocking statute since discovery is allowed 
230. See id. at 563. Having consuls take evidence takes less time because the consul 
doesn’t have to wait for a foreign authority to do its job the consul can gather evidence 
by his or her self. See discussion supra Part II.B, II.C. 
231. Elaborating on the specific economic benefits to the U.S. is outside of the scope of
this article and probably outside US courts’ ability to measure and determine.
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under the statute when the Hague Convention procedures are used. 
Finally, it also allows the United States a safety net to impose the FRCP
if a country refuses to supply data through the Hague Convention. 
B. Rewrite or Eliminate Article 23 
Next, Article 23 needs to be rewritten or eliminated.  If rewritten, it 
needs to reflect that pre-trial discovery in the Hague Convention means 
discovery before a suit has taken place.  If not rewritten, it should be
eliminated, which is the only way that the United States can be expected 
to abide by the Hague Convention as a first resort.  U.S. courts need to
be sure that a country cannot just opt out of a major portion of discovery
that the United States sees as vital to our judicial system.  This could be
difficult for other countries to agree to implement, but they are likely to
be swayed by the guarantee that the United States will resort to Hague 
Convention procedures. 
C. Release Litigants from Liability
Finally, the Hague Convention requires a clause stating that all 
signatories to the Hague Convention agree to release litigants from 
liability related to disclosure of data as long as the data is disclosed 
through the procedures of the Hague Convention.  This clause would 
eliminate litigants from having to convince the E.U. on a case-by-case 
basis that their discovery request is related to litigation and therefore, an
exception to the data privacy statutes.  Though the French blocking 
statute does not apply when the Hague Convention is used, this clause 
would clarify that there is no liability.  The clause would also prevent 
future blocking statutes attempting to interfere with Hague Convention 
procedures from being enacted. 
VIII. CONCLUSION
There has always been tension between European countries and the 
United States on the topic of evidence gathering.  Much of that tension 
stems from the inherent differences between common and civil policies
and methods.  Until the Hague Convention, the process for obtaining
evidence abroad was cumbersome and unreliable.  The Hague Convention 
sought to change that by providing signatory countries more effective 
methods of cooperating with each other in international litigation. 
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However, the Hague Convention has not been able to achieve its 
purpose, at least not in the United States. U.S. courts have interpreted the 
Hague Convention as optional, meaning it is rarely used.  In addition,
litigants in the E.U. often face stiff penalties for producing data in U.S. 
discovery.  Article 23 also makes it difficult for common law countries 
to accept that the Hague Convention protects their discovery goals. 
The combination of all the different laws and underlying policies is 
both confusing and complex.  Fixing the problem is not hopeless, 
though. The solution can be addressed by making the Hague Convention 
mandatory, rewriting Article 23, and releasing litigants who use the 
Hague Convention from liability.  By addressing the problem at its 
source, the text of the Hague Convention, many of the issues can be
dealt with and the Hague Convention can achieve its originally intended
purpose.
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